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FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
GLENN K. BEATON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

File wrapper estoppel is a doctrine that limits the extent to which a
patent can be broadened by the doctrine of equivalents. This article
reviews the policy of file wrapper estoppel and considers the application
of that policy by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) to a few typical fact patterns. The conclusion is
that a few recent Federal Circuit decisions have undermined file wrapper
estoppel in a way that is detrimental to the patent system.
The breadth of a patent is measured by what infringes it. Many different devices will infringe broad patents while relatively few will infringe narrow patents. Whether a given device infringes a patent is
determined by reference to the formal claims. Under patent law, every
element of a claim must be present in a device for the device to infringe
the claim literally. Therefore, under patent law claim interpretation, a
claim with elements A, B, and C is broader than a claim with elements A,
B, C, and D. This is because a device with only elements A, B, and C will
infringe the first claim but not the second because it lacks element D.
The doctrine of equivalents states that a device may infringe a patent claim, even if it lacks an element of the claim, if it contains a substitute element that is "equivalent" to the missing element.' Therefore, a
device with elements A, B, and C may infringe a claim with elements A,
B, C, and D if the device contains a substitute element that is equivalent
to D. The substitute element is equivalent to the missing element if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
2
to achieve the same result.
* Partner, Beaton & Swanson, Denver, Colorado; B.S., University of Colorado,
1977; J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1982.
1. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (hereinafter the "federal circuit") appeared
at one time to apply equivalents to entire claims rather than only to elements of claims, but
now seems to have withdrawn from that expansive approach. Compare Hughes Aircraft Co.
v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) with Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The confusion that resulted from those two
competing approaches is well documented. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co.,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (D.C. Neb. 1990); Harris, Three Ambiguities in the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 69 J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. SOC'Y 91 (1987); Hartman, Doctrine of
Equivalents, 70J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. Soc'Y 511 (1988); Nieman, The Federal Circuit
Resolves Ambiguities in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 70 J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. SOC'Y 153

(1988).
2. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. It is not clear why the doctrine was originally enundated so that the function and way must only be "substantially" the same, while the result
must apparently be exactly the same. A number of cases have allowed the result, function
and the way to be only substantially the same. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781
F.2d 861, 869 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 750
F.2d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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There are two limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. The first
limitation is that equivalents cannot be used to expand the claims to
cover the prior art.3 The other limitation, the subject of this article, is
file wrapper estoppel. 4 The law of file wrapper estoppel is unpredictable. In its broadest formulation, file wrapper estoppel has been held to
mean that the patentee cannot use equivalents to expand the claim
scope in an infringement action in a way that is inconsistent with his
position on claim scope before the Patent Office as reflected in the patent file wrapper. 5 In its narrowest formulation, file wrapper estoppel
has been held to mean that a patentee cannot use the doctrine of
equivalents to expand the claim scope to embrace the prior art. 6 The
correct formulation of file wrapper estoppel is somewhere between
these two extremes.
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

File wrapper estoppel under the 1952 Patent Act 7 goes back at least
as far as Graham v. John Deere,8 where the Supreme Court stated:
It is, of course, well settled that an invention is construed not
only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file
wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office. Claims as
allowed must be read and interpreted with reference to rejected ones and to the state of the prior art; and claims that
have been narrowed in order to obtain the issuance of a patent
by distinguishing the prior art cannot be sustained to cover that
which was previously by limitation eliminated from the patent. 9
At least three justifications can be advanced for this rule that came
to be called file wrapper estoppel, although these justifications are rarely
articulated. The first justification is the same as for any rule of estoppel:
it is inequitable to allow a person to take inconsistent positions as circumstances suit him.' 0 This justification parallels the justification for
3. See Loctite, 781 F.2d at 870; Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed.
Cir. 1983). See infra notes 19 and 36 and accompanying text.
4. File wrapper estoppel is now sometimes called "prosecution history estoppel."
Compare Allied Iron Co. v. Foundry Metal Specialties, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1017 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) with Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d 1351.
5. See, e.g., AlIed Iron, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1019 ("Stated in other words, file wrapper estoppel prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions in different transactions.")
(dicta); Hughes Aircraft, 717 F.2d at 1362 ("[File wrapper] estoppel applies to claim amendments to overcome rejections based on prior art and to arguments submitted to obtain the
patent.") (citing Coleco Indus., Inc. v. ITC, 573 F.2d 1247, 1257 (C.C.P.A. 1978) and
Dwyer v. United States, 357 F.2d 978, 984 (Ct. CI. 1966)).
6. See, e.g., Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1351.
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
8. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
9. Id. at 33 (citing Powers-Kennedy Co. v. Concrete Co., 282 U.S. 175, 185-86
(1930); Crawford v. Heysinger, 123 U.S. 589 (1887); Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
587 (1850)).
10. See Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Center, 886 F.2d 1285, 1295 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("The doctrines of prosecution history estoppel and equivalents are equitable in
nature, requiring courts to engage in a balancing analysis 'guided by equitable and public
policy principles underlying the doctrines involved and by the facts of the particular
case.'" (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Universal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985));
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the doctrine of equivalents. The often quoted Graver Tank rationale for
equivalents is that:
The essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud
on a patent. . . . 'To temper unsparing logic and prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of an invention' a patentee
may invoke this doctrine to proceed against the producer of a
device 'if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.' 1 '
If the roots of equivalency are in equity, and the Graver Tank language of "fraud" and "stealing" suggest that it is, then it seems natural
that the roots of the file wrapper estoppel limitation to equivalency
should be there too. However, neither the equitable formulations for
equivalency nor the equitable formulations for its limitation, file wrapper estoppel, provide much guidance in determining exactly where one
has crossed the line from equivalency into file wrapper estoppel. Moreover, equitable notions against taking inconsistent positions do not
seem sufficient alone to justify the file wrapper estoppel rule. It is common in the law to allow a party to take inconsistent positions, such as
12
pleading in the alternative.
A second justification given for file wrapper estoppel relates to the
concept that the scope of the patent should correspond to the scope
intended by the patentee and the Patent Office. This justification is
analogous to the rule that a contract should be construed in accordance
with the intent of the parties at the time it was entered into or the rule
that legislation should be construed in accordance with the intent of the
legislators. Reviewing the file wrapper in this sense is a logical extension of the ancient practice of reviewing the specification and the drawings; 13 the reviewer is merely ascertaining the intended meaning of the
claims.
If the "intent" being ascertained is that of the Patent Office rather
than the patentee, then this is a legitimate justification. The presumption of validity that attaches to patents based on the specialized knowledge of the Patent Office 1 4 should apply only to that which the Patent
Office intended to fall within the patent. However, if this is the justification for file wrapper estoppel, then file wrapper estoppel should not prevent the doctrine of equivalents from expanding the claim scope to
Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is 'an equitable tool for determining
the permissible scope of patent claims' as against a specific structure accused of infringement." (quoting Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prod. Co., 757 F.2d 255,
258 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 585 F. Supp. 1481,
1489 (E.D. La. 1984) (Failure to apply file wrapper estoppel would be "unrealistic and
fundamentally unfair."); POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 801-821 (5th ed. 1942).
11. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting
Sanitary Refrig. Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(e); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAICE § 8.32 (1990).
13. Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 587, 606 (1850) ("The Court did right, too,
in holding to the propriety of looking to the whole specification, and also to the drawings,
for explanation of any thing obscure.").
14. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
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cover that which the Patent Office did not intend the claim scope to
cover; it should merely remove the presumption of validity from that
expanded claim scope. It is always possible that the patentee is entitled
to a claim scope broadened by the doctrine of equivalents even if the
Patent Office did not intend to allow that broadened claim scope. In
fact, it is possible that the patentee is entitled to a claim scope broadened by the doctrine of equivalents even if the Patent Office affirmatively
intended not to allow that broadened claim scope. The Patent Office
makes mistakes, and the patentee should not be penalized for those mistakes. Courts should correct the Patent Office's mistakes, although the
corrections should not be granted the presumption of validity that is
based on the Patent Office's specialized knowledge.
On the other hand, if the intent being ascertained is really the intent
of the patentee rather than the Patent Office, as the cases suggest, 15
then this second justification for file wrapper estoppel carries little
weight. Analogizing the patentee and the Patent Office to parties to a
contract has little validity in this context. The patentee is not a party to
a contract whose intent should control the interpretation of the contract.
The patentee is a person receiving his statutory reward from the government for developing and disclosing an advancement in the sciences and
useful arts. As such, the patentee presumably "intends" that his reward
be as great as possible and that the limits to his reward be as small as
possible. He does not "intend" to give up any claim scope at all; he only
"intends" that the patent be issued. There is no negotiation between
the patentee and the Patent Office in the contract sense because neither
has any consideration to offer. The patentee has already given up his
consideration, for he has already developed his advancement in the sciences and useful arts. The Patent Office never had any consideration to
begin with, because it has no discretion to give anything other than what
the Patent Act requires it to give. For the same reason, the analogy between the Patent Office issuing a patent and legislators enacting legislation breaks down; unlike legislators, the Patent Office has no discretion.
One might argue that, although the patentee has already developed
his advancement, he has not yet disclosed it until the patent issues. The
patentee, therefore, still has some consideration to give in negotiating
the scope of the claims with the Patent Office because he could abandon
the application and maintain it as a trade secret. As a practical matter,
this argument generally fails because trade secret protection is inferior
to even narrow patent protection for most inventions. Further, trade
secret protection may be lost by the time the patentee is in a position to
threaten to abandon the application, because the invention has already
been commercialized, published in foreign applications, or otherwise
15. See DuPont v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("[A]rguments made during prosecution shed light on what the applicant meant by its
various terms."); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("Depending on the nature and purpose of an amendment, it may have a limiting
effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small to zero."); cf. 4 D. CHisuM, PATENTs
§ 18.05 [1] (2d ed. 1990) (referring to "mutually held construction" of the claims).
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disclosed. Finally, the patentee's threat to abandon the application is an
idle one; the Patent Office does not care if an application is abandoned
and its contents are kept as trade secrets.
The third justification for file wrapper estoppel is a practical one
based on the public's need to determine the claim scope of a patent.
The doctrine of equivalents frustrates the public's ability to rely on the
claims in determining the breadth of a patent, because it requires the
public to consider matters outside the four corners of the patent in making that determination. File wrapper estoppel says that if the doctrine of
equivalents requires the public to consider matters outside the four corners of the patent in determining the patentee's rights, then the public
should be able to rely on the patentee's own interpretation of those matters. This justification, similar to the detrimental reliance aspect of
promissory estoppel in equity, 16 was expressed well by the Federal
Circuit in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade
17
Commission:
The determination of equivalency by its nature is inimical to
the basic precept of patent law that the claims are the measure
of the grant. This constitutes a deviation from the need of the
public to know the precise legal limits of patent protection
without recourse to judicial ruling. We caution that the incentive to innovation that flows from "inventing
around" an ad8
versely held patent must be preserved.1
The principle objection to this justification is that it is circular. This
justification for the rule of file wrapper estoppel is that the public relies
on the file wrapper; but the public would not rely on the file wrapper if
there were no rule of file wrapper estoppel. However, it is not exactly
circular, for the fact is that the public looks at file wrappers for a variety
of reasons, and always will, even without the rule of file wrapper estoppel. Inevitably, inferences about the claim scope will be drawn from the
file wrapper, and the public should be entitled to rely on those inferences if they are fairly drawn. Therefore, reliance by the public as a
justification for file wrapper estoppel has considerable weight. In combination with the other two justifications which have less weight, it suggests that as long as the doctrine of equivalents is part of patent law, file
wrapper estoppel should be a limitation on it. 19
The important point to learn from a review of the policy considera16. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l. Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Prodyne Enter., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004
(1985); POMEROY'S Eourry JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (5th ed. 1942). Clearly, however, file
wrapper estoppel applies even if the particular defendant never saw the file wrapper.
17. 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
18. Id. at 1572.
19. One might argue that the doctrine of equivalents is used less now than it once
was, because now 35 U.S.C. § 112(6) allows expansive functional elements in place ofnarrow structural elements in a claim. For a discussion of the evolution of the doctrine of

equivalents and the interplay between 'the doctrine and § 112(6), see Hartman, Docinne of
Equivalents, 70J. PAT. TRADEMARK & OFF. Soc'Y 511 (1988).
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tions is that both the doctrine of equivalents and file wrapper estoppel
are rules of equity. As such, they do not lend themselves to inflexible
rules of application. Like any rule of equity, they depend on the subtle
weighing of a number of different factors. Some of the factors that may
be present in some typical circumstances are discussed in the following
section.
Before leaving the discussion of policy considerations, it should be
noted that there is one argument that is clearly not a justification for file
wrapper estoppel. That argument is that file wrapper estoppel is necessary to prevent the doctrine of equivalents from expanding the claims to
cover the prior art. The doctrine of equivalents certainly cannot be used
to expand the claims to cover the prior art, but this is a separate limitation on the doctrine of equivalents that has nothing to do with file wrapper estoppel. This is a limitation imposed by section 102 of the Patent
Act; 20 claims that are expanded to embrace the prior art are invalid
under the rules of anticipation. The better-reasoned cases are explicit in
stating that the file wrapper estoppel limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents is distinct from the section 102 limitation on the doctrine of
21
equivalents.
This misjustification for file wrapper estoppel has spawned some
unfortunate case law, some of which is mentioned in the fact patterns
discussed below. Briefly, these cases seem to state that the only limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is that the claims cannot be expanded
to cover the prior art. If the allegedly infringing device is not actually in
the prior art, then according to these cases file wrapper estoppel will
never preclude a holding of infringement by equivalents. Under these
cases, there is a section 102 limitation on equivalents, but there is no
separate file wrapper estoppel limitation on equivalents.
III.

FACT PATTERNS

Discussed below are several typical fact patterns in which file wrapper estoppel may be an issue. The discussion proceeds from fact patterns where file wrapper estoppel is more likely to apply to those where
file wrapper estoppel is less likely to apply.
A.

Amendments Necessary to Overcome PriorArt That Would Have Barred the
Claim

The first and easiest fact pattern involving the application of file
wrapper estoppel is one where the patentee narrows his claim to overcome prior art that would have barred the broader claim. In this case,
20. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
21. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Carman
Industries, Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Sarkisian v. Sign-Up Corp.,
220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 802, 806 (D. Or. 1983). See also Haworth v. Steelcase, Inc., 685 F.
Supp. 1422, 1440 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("The alleged infringer need not be practicing the
prior art for the doctrine of equivalents to be barred." (quoting Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d
at 1558)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
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the patentee should not be allowed to expand the claim scope by the
doctrine of equivalents in an infringement action to recover the scope
surrendered before the Patent Office. However, as discussed above, this
is not an application of the file wrapper estoppel limitation to
equivalents, but is an application of the section 102 limitation to
equivalents. 2 2 The ambiguous judge-made rules of file wrapper estoppel are not necessary when the Patent Act itself supplies concrete and
often-construed rules of anticipation under section 102.
Patent rights are sometimes analogized to property rights. Under
that analogy, there is no need to resort to subtle and complex principles
of equity such as estoppel to arrive at the holding that the metes and
bounds description of property (the claim scope) cannot be expanded to
cover that which is clearly owned by someone else (the prior art). Application of estoppel should be reserved for hard cases where the disputed
territory is neither covered by the literal metes and bounds (the claims)
nor owned by someone else (the prior art).
B. Amendments to Overcome PriorArt Reections That Would Not Have
Barredthe Claim
The answer to the question of whether file wrapper estoppel applies
is less certain when the patentee narrows a claim to overcome a prior art
rejection which was improper or when the patentee amends his claim
more than necessary to avoid a proper prior art rejection. The patentee
clearly cannot use equivalents to recover the claim scope portion that
was necessary to surrender to avoid the prior art, for that would violate
the section 102 limitation on equivalents and would render the claim
invalid. But may the patentee recover the claim scope portion that was
surrendered, but was not necessary to surrender, to avoid the prior art?
File wrapper estoppel may bar the patentee from recovering the
surrendered claim scope in these circumstances.2 3 Otherwise, file wrapper estoppel only prevents the patentee from recovering claim scope
that would have been barred by the prior art. File wrapper estoppel
would then be meaningless, for it would be superfluous to section 102 in
merely preventing the patentee from recovering a claim scope that is
invalid as anticipated.
Whether file wrapper estoppel actually applies in such circumstances will depend, of course, on a number of equitable factors. Some
of these factors will be peculiar to the particular case under consideration, but some are common to all such cases. Militating in favor of file
22. See Carmen Industries, 724 F. 2d 932; Sarkisian, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 802.
23. See Fortel Corp. v. Phone-mate, Inc., 825 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Prodyne
Enter., Inc. v.Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kinzenbaw v. Deere &
Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004 (1985); Pero v. General
Motors Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 719 (E.D. Mich. 1986). But see Hi-Life Prods., Inc. v.
American Natural Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Great Northern
Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC,
Inc., 776 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 721 F. Supp. 28
(D. Conn. 1989).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68:2

wrapper estoppel is that the public's effort to determine the scope of the
patent in the absence of file wrapper estoppel could become difficult
because it could require an extensive review of all relevant prior art to
determine whether the rejection that precipitated the claim amendment
was erroneous and whether the patentee surrendered more claim scope
than was necessary. Also, it is difficult to sympathize with the patentee
who erroneously surrendered more claim scope than was necessary to
avoid the prior art. The patentee already had ample opportunity to dispute an erroneous rejection by reviewing the prior art himself, by communicating his position to the Patent Office, and by appealing the Patent
Office decision if necessary. Patent Office procedures allow amendment, argument, and appeal precisely for this purpose. There would
have to be strong reasons to allow the patentee a second opportunity to
expand the patent monopoly, especially when the result is to deceive the
24
public as to the scope of his patent.
The unpredictable results of an inflexible rule that file wrapper estoppel does not limit equivalents if the rejections were improper or the
amendment was too limiting are illustrated in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States. 25 The patentee in Hughes Aircraft amended the claims to overcome certain prior art cited by the examiner. For the dissent, this
presented a classic case of file wrapper estoppel: "The accused S/E
spacecraft do not contain those elements which were expressly included
to overcome prior art ....
An infringing article must embody the two
elements I have mentioned, either literally or through an appropriate
'2 6
equivalent. Those elements show the invention which was patented."
The majority asserted that this application of estoppel, to which patent attorneys and courts had adhered for generations, was "wooden"
and amounted to a "view that virtually any amendment of the claims
creates a 'file wrapper estoppel' effective to bar all resort to the doctrine
of equivalents, and to confine patentee 'strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted.' ",27 The majority rejected that view and asserted
24. See Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1558; Haworth, 685 F. Supp. at 1441 ("Indeed, a
fundamental purpose of the claims is to precisely demarcate where others may or may not
endeavor." (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369
(1938))).
25. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Hughes is currently somewhat discredited for its
application of the "entirety" approach to equivalents. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The majority's departure from our recent
precedents is illustrated by an examination of [Hughes] which is clearly being overruled by
the majority, despite not even being mentioned in its opinion.") (Bennet, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d 383. But see Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA
Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989). However, Hughes is still cited frequently for its view of file wrapper estoppel. See, e.g., Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv.
Center, 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. ITC, 867 F.2d 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
26. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1366. The majority disregarded the dissent's reasoning that
each element must be present for there to be infringement with the "entirety" test. Under
that test, equivalents is applied "to the entirety of the accused S/E spacecraft." Id. at 136364.
27. Id. at 1362 (citing Nationwide Chemical Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718-19
(5th Cir. 1978)); Ekco Products Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 455 (7th
Cir. 1965).
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that the Supreme Court had rejected it also. 2 8
The Hughes majority mischaracterized the dissent, apparently so
that the holding in Hughes would appear consistent with Supreme Court
precedent or at least Graver Tank dicta. The dissent did not assert that
any claim amendment limits the patentee to the literal scope of the
claim. Such a holding would not only be wooden, but would be wrong
because it would prevent the patentee from relying on equivalents to
broaden the claim in ways unrelated to the amendment. Instead, the
dissent merely asserted the general rule that if a patentee surrenders a
claim scope to avoid prior art during the prosecution, then there must
be strong countervailing reasons to allow him to recover that same claim
scope in litigation. 29 In view of the non-pioneering status of the inven30
tion in this case, there were no such strong reasons.
The Hughes majority diverged from the long-standing rule of file
wrapper estoppel by shifting the focus from the amendment itself and
the other legitimate equitable considerations, to the prior art that precipitated the amendment:
The government is not claiming that its S/E spacecraft are built
and operated in accord with the prior art, or that it is merely
following the teachings of [the prior art]. If it had followed
those teachings in constructing its S/E spacecraft, there is no
question that the range of equivalents to which [the patent] is
entitled could not be broad enough to encompass such
31
spacecraft.
The majority's statement suggests that the doctrine of equivalents
cannot be used to broaden the claims to encompass the prior art. That
statement merely restates the rule that section 102 invalidates claims
that read on the prior art. The question remains: What is the effect of
the amendment to the claims? According to Hughes, the answer is that
the amendment to the claims has no effect because the claims themselves are no longer important. The court proceeds to ignore the claims
and to construct its own fictitious claims.3 2 The court then holds that
the fictitious claims were infringed (which was unfortunate for the de28. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362.
29. See, e.g., Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 (1935);
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406 (Ist Cir. 1965).
30. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1366.
31. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1362.
32. Id. at 1364.
There are striking overall similarities between Williams' claimed satellite and the
S/E spacecraft: (1) each is spin-stabilized; (2) each contains ajet on the periphery,
connected by a valve to a tank containing fluid for expulsion substantially parallel
to the spin axis; (3) each employs sun sensors to sense ISA position; (4) each
requires knowledge of orientation relative to a fixed external coordinate system;
(5) each contains radio equipment for communicating with the ground; (6) each
transmits spin rate and sun angle information to a ground crew; and (7) in each,
jet firing is synchronized with ISA position to effect controlled precession and
thus to achieve a desired orientation ....
Clearly, the StE spacecraft are much
closer to Williams' satellite than they are to [the prior art] space vehicle. It is
clear also that, in constructing its S/E spacecraft, the government followed the
teachings of Williams' much more than it did those of [the prior art].
Id. While the majority prefaces this list of comparisons with a reference to Williams'
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fendant and the rest of the public that had lacked the prescience to predict the court's fictitious claims and had instead relied on the actual
claims).
Hughes apparently holds that if a fictitious claim can be constructed
to establish literal infringement, and the fictitious claim is not invalid
under section 102, then there is equivalence. This rule implies that not
only do amendments to the claims have no effect, but the claims themselves also have no effect.
It should be noted in passing that formulating fictitious claims is not
necessarily a bad approach to equivalents,38 but the wisdom of that approach is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of this article,
the point is that if fictitious claims are to be the approach, they are subject to both section 102 and file wrapper estoppel limitations. If the
fictitious claims read on the prior art, then they should be disallowed
under section 102. If the fictitious claims are inconsistent with the file
wrapper, then they should be disallowed under file wrapper estoppel if
the equitable factors so dictate.
Notwithstanding the general erosion of Hughes, some courts continue to adhere to the notion that the only limitation to the doctrine of
equivalents is that the claims cannot be expanded to read on the prior
art. In Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Service Center,34 another opinion by
the author of Hughes, the court extravagantly criticized the district court
opinion that denied a motion for preliminary injunction on file wrapper
estoppel grounds. In response to the district court's statement that a
particular limiting amendment to overcome prior art estopped the patentee from asserting the doctrine of equivalents to expand the claims
beyond the limitation, the court said:
The amendment cited by the [district] court would be fatal to a
range of equivalents that would encompass (the prior art) or a
similar device ... ; it would not be 'fatal to application of the
doctrine itself.' Considering that virtually every patent application is amended, acceptance of the [district] court's statement
as a proper application of prosecution8 5history would read the
doctrine of equivalents out of the law.
Even if the district court had adapted an inflexible rule that the patentee could never recover a claim scope given up by amendment (and it
is not clear that it did adopt such a rule), such a rule still does not read
the doctrine of equivalents out of the law. Although it is true that most
claims are amended, not all claim limitations arise by amendment; in
claimed satellite, the comparison is not with the claims at all, for it ignores at least
elements in the claim. Id. at 1366 (Davis, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Insta-Foam Prod., Inc. v. Universal Foam Sys., Inc., 906 F.2d 698
Cir. 1990); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677
Cir. 1990).
34. 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
35. Id. at 1295. (quoting LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. Dudley Shearing, 867 F.2d
1576 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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fact, most claim limitations are in the claims from the outset. The doctrine of equivalents would still apply to those limitations.
It is ironic that the district court is falsely accused of reading
equivalents out of the law, for that is precisely what the Federal Circuit
proceeds to do to file wrapper estoppel in Black & Decker. The Federal
Circuit's analysis was similar to the formulation of fictitious claims in
Hughes. The court made a comparison showing that the claimed invention and the infringing device were similar in ways that did not read on
the prior art. Therefore, there was infringement by equivalents. The
prosecution history is irrelevant in this analysis.
The language of the opinion is more subtle than that, duly citing
Hughes and Loctite for the propositions that:
[t]he doctrines of prosecution history estoppel and equivalents
are equitable in nature, requiring courts to engage in a balancing analysis 'guided by equitable and public policy principles
underlying the doctrines involved and by the facts of the particular case.' Hence this court has held that the mere fact of
amendment does not necessarily preclude application of the
latter doctrine, pointing out that an amendment may result in a
limiting effect on the range of equivalents
'within a spectrum
36
ranging from great to small to zero.'
Notwithstanding this language suggesting a sensitive weighing of
the equitable considerations, the answers to these questions are irrelevant according to the analysis actually applied by the court. The only
relevant issue in the court's analysis is whether the equivalent claim
reads on the prior art. If it does not, this court says there can be infringement by equivalents, regardless of the prosecution history.
C. Amendments for Purposes Other Than to Overcome Prior Art
The question here is whether file wrapper estoppel should apply to
limit application of the doctrine of equivalents when the claims were
amended for some reason other than a prior art rejection, such as a section 1123 7 rejection. In principle, one can argue that file wrapper estoppel should not apply in such circumstances. The patentee made no
admission concerning the extent of his improvement over the prior art,
and so he cannot be estopped from expanding the scope of his claims.
On the other hand, it may be difficult for the public to determine the
purpose of an amendment in the context of an infringement analysis.
Often there are multiple purposes and sometimes the purpose is not
apparent from the file wrapper without deposing the prosecuting patent
attorney, the applicant, or the examiner. Further, patent attorneys
sometimes amend a claim to avoid prior art under the pretense of some
other purpose. Encouraging this practice does nothing to advance the
sciences and useful arts.
The cases occasionally assert that the purpose of an amendment
36. Id.

37. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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was merely to make the claim "more definite" rather than to narrow it,
and that therefore file wrapper estoppel should not apply.38 An amendment may perhaps make a claim more definite without narrowing it if the
amendment has language with the effect of narrowing certain limitations
while broadening others. Unfortunately, a few cases have held that file
wrapper did not apply because an amendment merely made a claim
more definite when, in fact, the amendment clearly narrowed the claim.
For example, in the Andrew3 9 case the court found that a phrase was a
"material limitation because it was added during prosecution" and,
therefore, it precluded literal infringement. 40 The court inexplicably
held that there was still infringement by equivalents and there was no
file wrapper estoppel effect because "it seems more appropriate to characterize the [addition] as a clarification .... [W]here the amendments
were made for the purposes of explication and clarity, the court does not
think it appropriate to invoke estoppel against the doctrine of
equivalents."'4 1 The Court does not indicate what it was about the addition that made it "more appropriate" to characterize it as a "clarification" rather than a limitation.
There may be a good reason, but the court should articulate it so
that the rest of us can keep it in mind next time. It is more likely that
there is no reason, but the court believed that equitable considerations
of the case precluded the application of file wrapper estoppel. That is
an acceptable analysis but, again, the equitable considerations should be
articulated.
A few special circumstances will arise where claim amendments or
cancellations clearly do not give rise to file wrapper estoppel, for exam42
ple, the cancellation of claims in response to a restriction requirement.
Such special circumstances are readily distinguishable from others involving claim amendments and cancellations, and should easily preclude
any file wrapper estoppel effect. 43
IV.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of equivalents undermines the important policy that
the public should be able to determine the scope of a patent, a policy
that is crucial to the integrity and respect of the patent system. Depending on the equitable considerations, file wrapper estoppel may limit the
doctrine of equivalents, and thereby limit the undermining of that important policy as well. This limitation arises only occasionally but is ra38. E.g., Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.P.A., 714 F.2d 1 110 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
39. Andrew Corp., 847 F.2d at 819.
40. Id. at 824.
41. Id. at 825.
42. See, e.g., Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l. Research B.V., 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1056, (D.C.D.C. 1983), vacated, 738 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
43. In the case of a cancellation in response to a restriction requirement, for example,
file wrapper estoppel should not apply to the reinstated claims in the divisional application
since the cancellation was in the parent patent.
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tional and fair. Unfortunately, some recent cases have applied or failed
to apply file wrapper estoppel without an intelligible discussion of the
equitable factors involved.
The most distressing of the recent cases are those that have suggested that what the patentee did in the prosecution of the patent is
irrelevant and is no limitation at all on the doctrine of equivalents. The
only limitation, according to these cases, is that the doctrine of
equivalents cannot be used to expand the patent to cover the prior art.
That limitation, although valid, is a separate limitation based on section
102 and is not related to file wrapper estoppel. The faulty reasoning of
these cases would effectively extinguish the doctrine of file wrapper
estoppel.

